sábado, 29 de noviembre de 2025
Hoppe: Libre Comercio de Bienes, Control Local o Concéntrico de Migración
miércoles, 26 de noviembre de 2025
Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics: The Internal Proof for Natural Law
Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics: The Internal Proof for Natural Law
Ludwig von Mises made a monumental contribution to Philosophy by grounding Kantian categories of the mind into categories of action. Kant had challenged philosophy and science with the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge—truths about reality knowable independent of experience. Mises accepted that challenge and relocated it: the categories aren't pre-existing structures of consciousness, but presuppositions embedded in human action itself.
This breakthrough opened two revolutionary paths. First, it established Mises's praxeological approach in Economics, demonstrating essential theorems and laws from the axiom of purposeful action without recourse to empirical testing. But second—and equally profound—it laid groundwork for future students like Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who would extend those same axioms and premises into Ethics (and Law) itself.
Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics stands as one of the most ingenious defenses of libertarian property rights ever developed. But its true significance lies not in opposition to natural law theory—it's a subset that fortifies Thomistic natural law from within.
When Murray Rothbard first was presented Hoppe's argumentation ethics in the late 1980s, he celebrated it as a breakthrough. Here was a defense of private property that didn't rely on theological premises or contested empirical claims about human flourishing. Instead, it demonstrated that anyone who argues—about anything—must presuppose the very property norms libertarians defend. To deny libertarian ethics while arguing is performatively contradictory.
But Rothbard understood something deeper. Rothbard was influenced by Thomas Aquinas's philosophy (Thomism). The Thomists believe that all beings (including humans) have a nature and their nature has telos (end) that can be known by human reason. For the Thomists, a universal ethic needs to be compatible and derive from this human nature. Hoppe's contribution wasn't an alternative to this tradition—it was its most rigorous internal validation.
The Thomistic Foundation: Human Nature as Knowable
Natural law theory rests on a straightforward claim: humans have a specific nature, knowable through reason, and ethical norms derive from that nature. As Rothbard emphasized in The Ethics of Liberty, this doesn't require theological premises. The Jesuit Suarez pointed out that many Scholastics had taken the position that the natural law of ethics, the law of what is good and bad for man, does not depend upon God's will. Indeed, some of the Scholastics had gone so far as to say that even though God did not exist, or did not make use of His reason, or did not judge rightly of things, if there is in man such a dictate of right reason to guide him, it would have had the same nature of law as it now has.
The challenge for natural law theorists has always been specifying what counts as "human nature." The concept is admittedly broad. Humans eat, sleep, reason, procreate, create art, form societies. Which features are ethically relevant? And how do we derive specific norms—like prohibitions against theft or assault—from general observations about human biology and psychology?
This is where Hoppe's contribution becomes decisive. It is not the wider concept of human nature but the narrower one of propositional exchanges and argumentation which must serve as the starting point in deriving an ethic. Moreover, there exists an a priori justification for this choice insofar as the problem of true and false, of right and wrong, does not arise independent of propositional exchanges.
Argumentation as the Essence of Human Nature
Hoppe's insight was to recognize that human nature, in its ethically relevant dimension, is the nature of a being capable of argumentation. This isn't arbitrary. Ethics only matters for beings who can dispute what ought to be done. Rocks and trees don't need ethics. Even non-human animals, lacking propositional language, don't engage in ethical debates about property rights.
Humans are different. We are the species that argues about how to live, what rules should govern us, who owns what. This capacity for argumentation isn't incidental to our nature—it's the defining feature that makes ethics necessary and possible.
Argumentation is a type of human action and therefore is ruled by praxeology laws. Hoppe used the same definition of argumentation as Apel and Habermas, but this insight enabled him to know that argumentation presupposes the utilization of the person's body as the primary means of action. When you argue, you must use your body—your vocal cords, your brain, your hands to gesture or type. And you must use external resources—air to carry sound, space to stand in, time to formulate thoughts.
Argumentation, therefore, presupposes property rights. Not as something we should respect, but as something we must presuppose to argue at all. To argue against property rights, you must first claim property in your body (to speak) and in scarce resources (to exclude others from using your vocal cords simultaneously or occupying the same space).
The Synthetic A Priori: Hoppe's Post-Kantian Method
Hoppe employs what he calls a synthetic a priori approach, following Kant's distinction between analytic truths (true by definition) and synthetic truths (describing reality). Mises and Hoppe, being post-Kantians or even anti-Kantians (in the sense that they answered his challenge or "grounded" his system that got many philosophers "stuck" in a few ways), justify it rationalistically; that is, they consider that to deny this proposition is to affirm it. For one cannot deny that humans act purposefully without acting purposefully. Therefore, such an axiom is a result of the application of the laws of logic and is dependent on an apriori way of thinking.
This differs from Rothbard's epistemology. In slight distinction with Hoppe and Mises, Rothbard finds his epistemological roots in the empirical tradition of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, he considers the proposition that "human beings act purposefully" to be founded on experience, on observing both one's self and other humans.
But this methodological difference doesn't create opposition—it creates complementarity, in my view. Rothbard's Thomistic approach identifies human nature through observation and reason. Hoppe's argumentation ethics provides an internal proof for it: it shows that anyone who argues must presuppose the very norms that natural law theorists independently derive from observing human nature.
Bridging the Is-Ought Gap Without Crossing It
Natural law theorists have long struggled with Hume's is-ought problem: how do you derive normative claims (what ought to be) from descriptive claims (what is)? Hoppe's solution is elegant. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an "ought" from an "is." The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification — a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one's body and the homesteading principle — a priori true is-statement; and (c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified — a priori true is-statement.
Hoppe doesn't claim to derive oughts from is. He demonstrates that if you engage in argumentation at all, you've already presupposed certain norms. The "ought" is embedded in the practice of arguing itself. To argue against private property is to perform a contradiction—using your property (your body, your time, the space you occupy) to deny the legitimacy of property.
This is the "internal" proof for natural law. It doesn't tell us that humans should argue or that argumentation is morally superior to violence. It shows that argumentation, as an activity, presupposes the norms that natural law theorists defend on other grounds.
Scarcity and Original Appropriation
The connection deepens when we consider scarcity. Conflict exists in a world of scarce resources and therefore property assignment rules are to be demanded. In order for one to justify any of these rules, that is, in order to put forth an argument in defense of a political theory, one must presuppose self-ownership.
Human action—including argumentation—takes place in a world of scarcity. Multiple people cannot simultaneously occupy the same space or use the same vocal cords. Property rights emerge as the solution to potential conflicts over scarce resources. And the original appropriation principle—homesteading—follows necessarily: the first person to use a previously unowned resource establishes a better claim than later arrivals who wish to dispossess him.
This is exactly what Thomistic natural law theorists argue from a different starting point. Humans have a nature that requires using scarce resources. Conflicts arise over these resources. Reason dictates rules that minimize conflict and enable human flourishing. Those rules happen to be the libertarian property norms.
Hoppe's argumentation ethics confirms this from within the practice of ethical discourse itself.
Fortification From Within
Natural law theory faces external challenges: skeptics who deny that human nature exists, relativists who claim ethics are culturally constructed, utilitarians who subordinate rights to consequences. Hoppe's argumentation ethics doesn't answer all these challenges—but it makes one crucial contribution.
It shows that anyone who argues about ethics—including the skeptic, the relativist, the utilitarian—has already presupposed the libertarian property norms. You can refuse to argue. You can simply use violence without justification. But the moment you try to justify your use of violence, or argue that property rights don't exist, you've implicitly recognized property rights by claiming your body as exclusively yours for the duration of the argument.
This is fortification from within. Even if someone rejects the broader Aristotelian-Thomistic framework—rejects teleology, rejects that human nature determines ethical norms—they cannot reject the norms presupposed by argumentation without contradiction. As long as humans are the species that argues about what ought to be done, argumentation ethics provides an internal proof for the norms natural law theory defends.
Reconciling the Traditions
The reconciliation works because both traditions identify the same reality from different angles. Thomistic natural law observes human nature—including our capacity for reason and argument—and derives ethical norms. Hoppe's argumentation ethics examines the presuppositions of argumentation itself and discovers those same norms embedded in the practice.
As one scholar notes, Hoppe's approach solves a persistent problem in natural law theory: It has been a common quarrel with the natural rights position, even on the part of otherwise sympathetic observers, that the concept of human nature is far too diffuse to allow the derivation of a determinate set of rules of conduct. The praxeological approach solves this problem by recognizing that it is not the wider concept of human nature but the narrower one of propositional exchanges and argumentation which must serve as the starting point.
Human nature, in its ethically decisive feature, is the nature of beings capable of argumentation. Natural law theorists arrive at this through observation and philosophical reflection. Hoppe demonstrates it through transcendental analysis of argumentation's presuppositions. Both paths lead to the same destination: libertarian property rights are grounded in human nature itself.
Rothbard celebrated Hoppe's contribution because he saw it for what it was—not a replacement for natural law theory, but its most rigorous internal validation. The fortress of natural law now has walls reinforced from both without (the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition) and within (argumentation ethics). Anyone who wishes to storm that fortress must first explain how they can argue against it without presupposing its truth.
| Aspect | Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics | Thomistic Natural Law | Reconciliation via Rothbard |
|---|---|---|---|
| Method | Post-Kantian synthetic a priori; performative contradictions in discourse. | Aristotelian demonstrative reason from human nature/teleology. | Praxeological axioms as NL foundation; AE as breakthrough generalizing ethics without values. |
| Human Nature | Species capable of argumentation; presupposes self-ownership for action. | Rational being oriented to goods like knowledge; reason discovers moral principles. | AE demonstrates NL's rational essence; property from will's proprietorship. |
| Scarcity & Property | Action in scarcity generates homesteading to resolve conflicts. | Secondary precepts preserve life; appropriation aligns with flourishing. | Homesteading as labor mixing; AE fortifies via contradiction in denial. |
| Proof Type | Internal: Presuppositions of argumentation prove norms. | External: Derived from eternal law/human inclinations. | AE as internal fortification; complements NL's radical critique of statism. |
Addressing Common Criticisms of Argumentation Ethics
While Hoppe's argumentation ethics (AE) provides a robust internal proof for natural law norms, it has faced several critiques that merit attention. One prominent criticism, advanced by Robert P. Murphy and Gene Callahan, argues that AE establishes only limited or temporary self-ownership: participants in debate presuppose control over body parts essential for argumentation (e.g., mouth, brain) solely during the discourse, not permanent or full ownership of the entire body or external resources. This view posits that a collectivist could argue against absolute rights without contradiction, as long as force (e.g., for redistribution) occurs outside the debate. Similarly, Jonathan Ashbach contends that AE's methodology is faulty, as argumentation does not inherently assume ethical precepts; a nihilist might argue strategically without moral implications, and teleological ethics could justify limited rights for higher ends like the common good. Another refutation highlights a conflation of liberty rights (permission to argue) with claim rights (duties on others), suggesting AE proves only the former, not libertarian self-ownership.
These critiques, however, do not undermine AE's compatibility with Thomistic natural law; rather, they highlight its scope as a complementary demonstration. Defenders like Frank van Dun respond that AE is a priori and dialectical, extending beyond the immediate argument: denying self-ownership post-debate without justification excludes one from rational discourse, as argumentation presupposes treating others as free, equal persons universally. Even if AE yields only contextual rights, this aligns with natural law's secondary precepts, which derive situational norms from human nature's rational essence. Rothbard himself viewed AE as transcending such limits by generalizing ethics value-free, fortifying natural law against empiricist challenges. Thus, while AE may not prove absolute libertarianism in isolation, it strengthens Thomism by evidencing argumentative human nature, with critiques inviting refinement rather than rejection.
| Criticism | Key Proponents | Core Argument | Defense in Context of Natural Law |
|---|---|---|---|
| Limited Self-Ownership | Murphy/Callahan, Ashbach | Only temporary/partial rights during debate | Dialectical extension makes rights enduring; aligns with NL's secondary precepts |
| No Performative Contradiction | Ashbach | No ethical assumptions in arguing | A priori presuppositions treat arguers as free persons, evidencing rational human nature |
| Conflation of Use and Rights | Murphy/Callahan, Bleeding Heart | Use ≠ ownership; liberty ≠ claim rights | Synthetic a priori embeds norms; complements Thomistic teleology for flourishing |
In sum
In conclusion, Hoppe's argumentation ethics serves as a vital subset of Thomistic natural law, providing an internal proof that human nature—as that of a species capable of argumentation—necessitates ethical norms like self-ownership and property rights in a world of scarcity. This reconciliation, as Rothbard insightfully recognized, bridges post-Kantian methods with Aristotelian-Thomism, fortifying the tradition against external challenges while enriching its philosophical arsenal. Ultimately, it underscores that libertarian ethics are not arbitrary but inescapably grounded in the logic of rational discourse, offering a timeless framework for resolving conflicts and promoting human flourishing.
Juan Fernando Carpio, M.E.E.
Sources:
- Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. "A Primer on Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics." Mises Institute, 2024.
- Maciel, Lucas. "An Interpretative Model of the Evolution of Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics." Studia Humana 9.2 (2020).
- Rothbard, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty. New York University Press, 1998.
- Meng, Jude Chua Soo. "Hopp(e)ing Onto New Ground: A Rothbardian Proposal for Thomistic Natural Law." 2002.
sábado, 22 de noviembre de 2025
"A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism": El Tratado Esencial de Hoppe
"A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism": El Tratado Esencial de Hoppe
Esta obra del prof. Hans-Hermann Hoppe publicada en 1989 representa una síntesis revolucionaria que fusiona la ética de la autopropiedad, la economía austriaca y el análisis sociológico de sistemas comparados. Su contribución trasciende la mera comparación económica para construir una teoría general de la organización social basada en la praxeología y la ética argumentativa.
La propiedad
Hoppe comienza con una demostración devastadora: la propiedad no es una convención cultural sino una necesidad lógica de la acción humana. Incluso en el Jardín del Edén, donde los recursos serían superabundantes y no habría conflicto material, cada ser humano necesitaría propiedad exclusiva sobre su propio cuerpo para actuar. No puedes deliberar, argumentar o elegir sin asumir que controlas tu cuerpo y nadie más lo hace simultáneamente.
Esta "apropiación original" del propio cuerpo es el fundamento irrefutable de toda ética, porque negar la autopropiedad requiere ejercer autopropiedad (performative contradiction). Quien argumenta contra la propiedad privada presupone el control exclusivo de su aparato vocal, su cerebro, su espacio físico. La propiedad, entonces, no emerge del contrato social ni del Estado, sino de la estructura lógica de la argumentación racional.
De aquí deriva su criterio para la apropiación legítima de recursos externos: el principio de homesteading, donde quien primero mezcla su trabajo -lo ocupa- con recursos no apropiados establece su título de propiedad. Cualquier otro criterio (necesidad, utilidad social, decisión mayoritaria) otorgaría derechos sobre recursos a quienes llegaron después, permitiendo el conflicto perpetuo sin un criterio objetivo de resolución.
Agresión, Capitalismo y Socialismo: Definiciones Nítidas
Agresión es definida con precisión praxeológica: la iniciación de violencia o amenaza de violencia contra la propiedad legítimamente apropiada de otro. No es agresión defenderse, ni es agresión la competencia económica o el "daño" emocional.
Capitalismo es el sistema donde todas las relaciones de propiedad se basan en la apropiación original, la producción voluntaria y el intercambio contractual. No es el "capitalismo realmente existente" con privilegios estatales, sino el orden emergente de la no-agresión consistente.
Socialismo, en su sentido amplio, es cualquier sistema donde existe propiedad institucionalizada de una persona sobre la propiedad de otra sin su consentimiento. Esta definición brillante captura desde el comunismo total hasta regulaciones mínimas: todos implican que A controla parcialmente lo que B produjo o apropió legítimamente.
La Preferencia Temporal: Sociología Austriaca Pionera
Aquí reside la innovación metodológica más importante de Hoppe. Mientras Mises y Rothbard usaron la preferencia temporal principalmente para teoría del interés, Hoppe la convierte en la herramienta fundamental del análisis sociológico comparativo.
Sus ejemplos son memorables: ¿por qué los filósofos tienden a defender el socialismo y los empresarios el capitalismo, mientras los trabajadores manuales y los borrachos favorecen políticas redistributivas? No por "intereses materiales" simplistas, sino por diferencias sistemáticas en orientación temporal.
El filósofo que nunca ha producido para el mercado tiene preferencia temporal alta: valora gratificación presente (status académico, aplausos de estudiantes) sobre acumulación futura. El empresario exitoso necesariamente tiene preferencia temporal baja: sacrificó consumo presente por inversión y producción diferida. El borracho epitomiza la preferencia temporal extremadamente alta: consume hoy aunque destruya mañana.
El socialismo, entonces, atrae naturalmente a quienes tienen alta preferencia temporal porque promete redistribución del stock de capital existente hacia consumo presente. El capitalismo requiere baja preferencia temporal: abstinencia, ahorro, respeto por acumulaciones ajenas que representan sacrificio pasado. Y a su vez, agreguemos, crea la seguridad político-legal y material futura para menor preferencia temporal futura (un bucle o círculo virtuoso).
Esta es sociología austriaca rigurosa: no empirismo estadístico sino deducción desde la acción humana. Las instituciones sociales no son neutras sino que sistemáticamente premian o castigan diferentes orientaciones temporales, alterando la composición del tejido social.
Los Cuatro Tipos de Socialismo: Taxonomía Exhaustiva
Hoppe delimita cuatro formas institucionales de socialismo según quién controla y quién pierde:
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Socialismo al estilo ruso-soviético: Propiedad pública de medios de producción, planificación central, prohibición de propiedad privada de capital. Los planificadores estatales ejercen control; los productores pierden completamente el fruto de su trabajo.
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Socialismo al estilo alemán-nazi: Propiedad nominal privada pero control estatal mediante regulación comprehensiva, controles de precios, producción dirigida. Los propietarios pierden el control decisional; los burócratas reguladores ganan poder sin asumir costos.
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Socialismo socialdemócrata: Estado de bienestar mediante impuestos y redistribución, pero manteniendo mercados en producción. Los pagadores netos de impuestos (productores de alto valor) pierden; los receptores netos (burócratas, beneficiarios) ganan.
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Socialismo conservador: Regulación moral y social de comportamientos mediante ley, manteniendo relativamente intacta la propiedad económica. Los "desviados" sociales pierden libertad; los guardianes morales ganan poder de censura.
La revelación crucial: prácticamente todo país contemporáneo mezcla estos cuatro tipos en diferentes proporciones. No existen purezas, sino gradaciones a lo largo de múltiples ejes de control institucionalizado. Estados Unidos tiene dosis menores de tipo 1, medianas de tipos 2-3, variables de tipo 4. Europa occidental enfatiza tipo 3, con remanentes de 2. China mezcla residuos de 1 con dosis crecientes de 2.
La Demolición del Estado
Aquí Hoppe explica que el Estado no es una agencia necesaria corrompida, sino una contradicción performativa institucionalizada. Si la agresión es ilegítima, ninguna organización basada en agresión sistemática (impuestos, monopolio territorial) puede legitimarse y da igual si es mediante votación, constituciones o "contratos sociales" ficticios.
La demolición procede en dos ejes:
Ético: El Estado viola continuamente el principio de no-agresión que toda argumentación racional presupone. No puedes justificar el Estado sin asumir su ilegitimidad.
Económico: El monopolio estatal de defensa produce lo que todo monopolio produce: servicios caros y degradados. Sin competencia ni prueba de pérdidas-ganancias, los "protectores" estatales devienen el mayor peligro para los protegidos.
Seguridad Competitiva: Critarquía Funcional
La alternativa de Hoppe es competencia descentralizada en provisión de defensa: múltiples agencias ofrecen protección mediante contrato voluntario, compitiendo por clientes. Los abusos se castigan con pérdida de clientes; la eficiencia se premia con crecimiento.
Como sugiero someramente, esto es una critarquía: múltiples fuentes independientes de adjudicación y arbitraje compiten por prestigio y adopción voluntaria. Lo crucial no es solo quién protege, sino quién adjudica disputas—ese es el poder definitivo. Un sistema de múltiples cortes y árbitros privados, vinculados por redes de reconocimiento mutuo y precedente, sin autoridad final que monopolice la interpretación legal.
¿Por Qué Este Es el Tratado Más Importante?
En cuarenta años ninguna obra ha igualado esta síntesis:
Fundamentación ética radical: Conecta propiedad con la lógica misma del discurso argumentativo, haciendo irrefutable la ética libertaria sin apelar a intuiciones o consecuencias.
Análisis sociológico austriaco: Convierte la preferencia temporal en microscopio social, explicando por qué ciertos grupos favorecen ciertos sistemas sin caer en marxismo economicista.
Taxonomía exhaustiva: Los cuatro tipos de socialismo capturan todas las formas históricas y contemporáneas, mostrando que el conflicto no es capitalismo/socialismo binario sino grados de agresión institucionalizada.
Radicalidad consistente: Lleva las premisas austro-libertarias a conclusiones anarcocapitalistas sin concesiones, desarrollando la visión completa de un orden sin Estado.
Demolición definitiva: No reforma del Estado sino su eliminación lógica y práctica, con alternativas institucionales concretas.
Mises construyó la teoría económica, Rothbard la ética y política libertaria. Hoppe completa el edificio: fundamentación ética irrefutable, sociología comparativa rigurosa, análisis institucional exhaustivo, visión positiva del orden competitivo. Es economía política en sentido clásico: ciencia integrada de instituciones, ética, economía y sociedad.
Por eso "A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism" es el tratado supremo de sistemas comparados: no porque "gane" debates, sino porque establece el marco categorial definitivo para entender organización social, propiedad y orden humano.
Carl Menger: The Copernicus of Economics and Discoverer of Win-Win Games
Carl Menger: The Copernicus of Economics and Discoverer of Win-Win Games
Carl Menger
The Discovery That Changed Everything
In 1871, a 31-year-old economist from Neu-Sandec published Principles of Economics. Carl Menger probably did't want to start a revolution. He sought to solve an old puzzle that bothered British classical economics: why is water, which we need to live, cheaper than diamonds, which we do not need? His answer — value is subjective and depends on the last unit (marginal) — started the Marginal Revolution and birthed the Austrian School. But Menger did something even bigger: he was the first to prove clearly that voluntary trade is win-win (positive-sum), not zero-sum.
This idea — trade creates new value, it does not just move it around — is like Copernicus’s change in astronomy: it moved the centre of the economic universe. Copernicus moved the centre from Earth to the Sun. Menger moved value from objective things (hours of work put in) to subjective opinions of people. If we really accepted this, it would change governments, policies, and the whole story of civilization. This article explains why Menger is the world’s first thinker on win-win games, a true Copernicus of Economics for giving the big turn that re-oriented the whole subject, and how understanding him deeply is necessary for lasting human prosperity.
I. The Discovery: Subjective and Marginal Value
A. The water-diamond paradox (classic problem)
British classical economists (Adam Smith, David Ricardo):
They separated “use value” (how useful somethwsing is) from “exchange value” (market price).
Paradox: Water has huge use value (you die without it) but low price. Diamonds have low use value (just pretty) but high price.
Their explanation failed: they tried to base value on production cost or labour put in (labour theory of value), but this did not solve the paradox.
B. Menger’s solution: Decreasing marginal utility
Big new idea (Principles, 1871):
1. Value is subjective:
“Value does not exist outside the minds of people. To speak of value inside things is a mistake.”
There is no objective value from labour or cost. Value is a personal judgement about how important a good is to satisfy a need at a particular moment.
2. Marginal (not total) utility sets value:
Water: The first glass is worth everything (you would die without it). The tenth glass is worth almost nothing (you are no longer thirsty).
Diamonds: The first diamond is worth a lot (rare luxury). The tenth diamond is still worth a lot (still rare).
Key point: Nobody chooses between ALL water and ALL diamonds in the world. People care about the last unit they can get — the marginal unit.
Solution to the paradox:
Water is usually abundant → the marginal unit has low extra usefulness → low price.
Diamonds are usually scarce → the marginal unit still has high usefulness → high price.
Result: Menger solved a 2,000-year-old puzzle (since Plato and Aristotle) with perfect logic based on subjectivity and marginality (we choose on units, at "the margin").
II. The Transformative Idea: Trade Is Win-Win
A. Strict logical proof (the Copernican moment)
Menger in his Principles (Chapter IV, “On Exchange”):
Person A values good X more than good Y.
Person B values good Y more than good X.
A has Y, B has X.
If they trade voluntarily:
A gives Y and gets X → A is better off.
B gives X and gets Y → B is better off.
Both gain, nobody loses. Trade creates value by moving goods to the people who value them most.
Comparison with astronomy:
Ptolemy: Earth in centre, planets move in complicated loops.
Copernicus: Sun in centre, simple orbits.
Classical British economics: Value is in things (labour put in); trade just moves fixed wealth (zero-sum).
Menger: Value is in people (subjective); trade creates new value (positive-sum).
Perfect match: Copernicus moved the centre from the observer (Earth) to the observed (Sun). Menger moved the source of value from objects (labour) to people (subjective valuation).
B. Why Menger is the world pioneer of game theory
Formal game theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) separates zero-sum games (one wins, the other loses) from positive-sum games (both win).
But in 1871 — 73 years earlier — Menger already proved voluntary exchange is positive-sum.
His clear concepts do the same job as Pareto optimality (formalised 35 years later in 1906).
III. Menger as Copernicus: The Turn That Re-Oriented Economics
A. Copernicus in astronomy: Moving the centre
Rejected Earth-centred model. Put Sun in centre. Made everything simpler. Kepler, Galileo, Newton built on it.
Essence: Change what is centre and what is periphery → huge conceptual shift.
B. Menger in economics: Moving the source of value
1. Rejected labour theory of value (Smith, Ricardo, Marx).
2. Put value in people’s subjective marginal utility.
3. Foundation of modern economics:
Neoclassical microeconomics (Marshall, Jevons, Walras) uses marginal utility (though with some important mistakes).
The Austrian School (Mises, Hayek, Rothbard) develops the full implications.
Essence: Value no longer lives “objectively” in things; it lives subjectively in people. This shift makes economics much clearer — just as heliocentrism removed complicated loops and made orbits simple.
Conclusion: Copernicus founded modern astronomy with one big conceptual turn. Menger did the same for modern economics: from objective value (in things) to subjective value (in people).
IV. Huge Implications Still Not Accepted
A. Politics: From zero-sum to positive-sum
Old story still common: Wealth is fixed; one side must lose for the other to win (mercantilism, Marxism, economic nationalism).
Mengerian truth: Every voluntary trade helps both sides. International trade makes everyone richer. Entrepreneurs create value, they do not steal it.
If accepted: End of tariffs, end of anti-business populism, end of trade wars. Global growth could be 2–3 times faster.
B. Ethics: From forced redistribution to value creation
Old ethics: Justice = take from rich, give to poor.
Menger-based ethics: Creating new value (inventions, companies) is morally superior to moving existing value. Forced redistribution often destroys incentives.
If accepted: Admiring creators and risk-taking builders, not politicians who only redistribute. Voluntary charity beats forced taxes.
C. Education: From “dismal science” to a science of cooperation
Old view: Economics = endless conflict over scarce resources.
Mengerian view: Economics = how people cooperate through voluntary exchange to make everyone richer. Growth has no fixed limit.
If accepted: Children and youth learning rational optimism and cooperation, not fear and class war.
D. International relations: From zero-sum power to win-win globalisation
Old realism: One country’s gain is another’s loss.
Mengerian truth: Trade between nations makes both richer. Rich trading partners buy more from you.
Historical proof: Europe after 1945 (EU) = peace. East Asia since 1979 = peace despite old hatreds.
If accepted: No more trade wars, faster globalisation, more peace.
V. Why Menger Is Still Ignored: Political Calculation Problem
A. Politicians win votes with zero-sum stories
Taking from the rich and giving to the poor is visible → votes.
Value creation by entrepreneurs is invisible → no votes.
Example: Politicians say “billionaires are bad”. Truth: Bezos created $1.5 trillion of value for customers and kept only around 10 %.
B. Media sell conflict, not cooperation
“Rich vs poor” gets clicks. “Trade helps everyone” is boring.
Result: Win-win stories lose against conflict stories.
Final Conclusion
In 1871 Menger did what Copernicus did in 1543: he moved the centre of a science. Copernicus put the Sun, not Earth, at the centre. Menger put subjective human valuation, not objective labour, at the centre. His discovery — voluntary trade is win-win because value is subjective and marginal — is as important for social science as heliocentrism was for astronomy.
If we fully accepted Menger's monumental contributions:
- End of protectionism and trade wars
- End of forced redistribution ethics
- Economics taught as cooperation, not conflict
- Global peace through trade
World growth would speed up 2-3X, conflicts would fall (between groups, not only countries), innovation would explode.
Menger is the Copernicus of economics and the first true win-win thinker. The ideas are solved — the only battle left is political: to beat the zero-sum stories that still win elections and headlines. That is the real challenge of the 21st century.
Carl Menger: El Copérnico de la Economía y el Descubridor de los Juegos Ganar-Ganar
Carl Menger: El Copérnico de la Economía y el Descubridor de los Juegos Ganar-Ganar
Carl Menger
El Descubrimiento que Cambió Todo
I. El Descubrimiento: Valor Subjetivo y Marginalidad
A. La paradoja del agua y los diamantes (problema clásico)
Economistas clásicos británicos (Adam Smith, David Ricardo):
B. La solución de Menger: Utilidad marginal decreciente
1. El valor es subjetivo:
2. La utilidad marginal (no la total) determina el valor:
Resolución de la paradoja:
II. La Implicación Revolucionaria: El Intercambio como Juego Ganar-Ganar
A. Demostración lógica rigurosa (el momento copernicano)
Menger en Principios (Cap. IV, “Sobre el Intercambio”):
B. Por qué esto es pionero mundial en teoría de juegos
III. Menger como Copérnico: El Giro que Reorientó la Ciencia
A. Copérnico en astronomía: Relocalización del centro
B. Menger en economía: Relocalización del valor
IV. Las Implicaciones Monumentales No Asimiladas
A. Política: De suma cero a suma positiva
B. Ética: De moralidad redistributiva a moralidad creativa
C. Educación: De la Economía como “ciencia lúgubre” a la Economía como ciencia de la cooperación y la creatividad
Si esto se asimilara:
D. Relaciones internacionales: De geopolítica suma cero a globalización suma positiva
Narrativa "realista" dominante (Kissinger, Mearsheimer):
Si esto se asimilara:
V. Por Qué Menger Sigue Sin Ser Asimilado: El Problema del Cálculo Político
A. Los políticos prosperan en narrativas de suma cero
B. Los medios de comunicación prosperan en narrativas de conflicto o crisis
Conclusión: Asimilar a Menger = Salto Civilizatorio
Las implicaciones de asimilar plenamente su obra:
miércoles, 19 de noviembre de 2025
De "Podría Funcionar" a "Debemos Volver": Por Qué los Libertarios Son Tímidos Ante la Evidencia Histórica Abrumadora de las Critarquías
De "Podría Funcionar" a "Debemos Volver": Por Qué los Libertarios Son Tímidos Ante la Evidencia Histórica Abrumadora de las Critarquías
La Timidez Intelectual Libertaria
Cuando los libertarios discuten sistemas de jueces competitivos sin legisladores centrales (ley sin Estado), típicamente usan lenguaje especulativo: "podría funcionar", "en teoría sería posible", "quizás en el futuro", "como experimento interesante". Esta timidez es intelectualmente inexplicable a la luz de la evidencia histórica. No estamos especulando sobre sistemas hipotéticos sin precedentes. Estamos hablando de cinco casos históricos documentados que operaron exitosamente durante siglos o milenios:
- Common Law inglés: 800 años de competencia judicial (siglos XI-XIX).
- Lex Mercatoria: 500 años de tribunales arbitrales privados (siglos XI-XVI).
- Irlanda céltica: 1,000 años de sistema Brehon sin Estado (650-1650).
- Islandia libre: 332 años sin gobierno central (930-1262).
- Derecho Romano republicano: Siglos de producción privada de normas (509-27 a.C.).
Total acumulado: Más de 2,500 años de evidencia empírica de que los sistemas de jueces competitivos funcionan, perduran, y generan derecho objetivo superior a los monopolios legislativos modernos.
Ante esta montaña de datos históricos, la posición intelectualmente coherente no es "podría funcionar". Es: "DEBEMOS volver a sistemas de jueces competitivos y abandonar la legislación monopolística, que es socialismo jurídico masivamente demostrado como fracasado y creador de injusticias".
I. La Timidez Libertaria: Síntomas del Problema
A. Lenguaje especulativo ante hechos históricos
Típico discurso libertario sobre critarquías:
- "Un sistema de tribunales privados podría resolver disputas eficientemente."
- "En teoría, los jueces competitivos tendrían incentivos para fallar justamente."
- "Sería interesante experimentar con sistemas de derecho privado."
Contraste con lenguaje sobre economía de mercado:
- "La competencia empresarial produce bienes mejores que planificación central."
- "El capitalismo es más próspero que socialismo."
- "Los mercados generan innovación; los monopolios estatales destruyen eficiencia."
Observación: Cuando hablan de economía, los libertarios usan lenguaje declarativo, basado en evidencia histórica masiva (Revolución Industrial, crecimiento asiático, colapso soviético). Cuando hablan de sistemas judiciales competitivos, usan lenguaje condicional, especulativo, a pesar de tener evidencia histórica igualmente masiva.
B. Falla en aprovechar superioridad epistémica
Comparación:
Socialistas ante fracasos (URSS, Venezuela, Cuba):
- "Eso no fue verdadero socialismo."
- "Necesitamos reintentar con mejores líderes."
- Mantienen ideal intacto mediante narrativa de "implementación defectuosa".
Libertarios ante éxitos históricos (Common Law, Lex Mercatoria, Brehon Law):
- "Bueno, eran sociedades diferentes."
- "No sabemos si funcionaría hoy."
- "Sería difícil de implementar políticamente."
- Abandonan ventaja epistémica masiva al no declarar victoria con evidencia en mano.
Resultado: Socialistas controlan la narrativa con cero casos exitosos. Libertarios ceden narrativa teniendo cinco casos exitosos milenarios.
II. Por Qué la Timidez es Injustificable: La Evidencia Es Abrumadora
A. No son experimentos teóricos; son hechos históricos probados
Common Law inglés (siglos XI-XIX):
- No es especulación. Funcionó durante 800 años.
- No es caso marginal. Generó la base legal del capitalismo anglosajón, el sistema más próspero de la historia.
- No es contextualmente irrelevante. Inglaterra en el siglo XII era sociedad compleja con comercio extenso, propiedad variada, conflictos sofisticados—comparable a sociedades modernas.
Comparación con otros "experimentos":
- Democracia ateniense: 180 años (508-338 a.C.). Los académicos la estudian como prueba definitiva de que democracia directa funciona en ciudades-estado.
- Common Law: 800 años. ¿Por qué no se estudia como prueba definitiva de que competencia judicial funciona?
Respuesta: Sesgo ideológico. La academia estatista no quiere admitir que sistemas sin monopolio legislativo funcionan mejor.
B. Comparación de durabilidad: Critarquías vs. Sistemas Legislativos Modernos
| Sistema | Duración | Colapso/Transformación |
|---|---|---|
| Brehon Law (Irlanda) | 1,000 años (650-1650) | Destruido por invasión militar inglesa, no por fallo interno |
| Common Law (Inglaterra) | 800 años (1100s-1900s) | Transformado por centralización parlamentaria Westminster, no por colapso |
| Lex Mercatoria | 500+ años (1100s-1600s) | Absorbido por Estados-nación emergentes, no por fracaso funcional |
| Islandia libre | 332 años (930-1262) | Conquistado por Noruega, no por guerra civil interna |
| Derecho Romano republicano | 482 años (509-27 a.C.) | Reemplazado por monopolio imperial, que luego colapsó |
| Constitución de EE.UU. | 236 años (1789-presente) | Violada sistemáticamente desde 1930s (New Deal); hoy papel mojado |
| Constitución de Weimar (Alemania) | 14 años (1919-1933) | Hitler llegó legalmente al poder y la suspendió |
| Código Civil Napoleónico | 220 años (1804-presente) | Requiere reformas constantes; miles de leyes especiales añadidas |
Conclusión: Los sistemas de jueces competitivos duraron 2-5× más que sistemas legislativos modernos, y colapsaron por conquista externa, no por fallo funcional interno.
Implicación: La carga de la prueba está invertida. No debemos preguntar "¿Podrían funcionar las critarquías?" Debemos preguntar: "¿Por qué seguimos usando sistemas legislativos que fallan sistemáticamente en 100-200 años, cuando tenemos evidencia de sistemas judiciales que funcionaron 500-1,000 años?"
C. Superioridad cualitativa demostrada, no especulativa
Métricas de éxito:
1. Coherencia legal:
- Common Law: Precedentes acumulados durante siglos sin contradicciones masivas (cada caso resolvía disputa concreta, no creaba normas abstractas que podían contradecir miles de leyes previas).
- Sistemas legislativos modernos: +185,000 páginas de regulaciones federales en EE.UU., +170,000 en UE, con contradicciones masivas que generan litigación infinita.
2. Adaptabilidad:
- Lex Mercatoria: Respondió a cambios en comercio internacional (nuevas rutas, nuevos instrumentos financieros) mediante precedentes case-by-case, sin necesidad de reformas legislativas.
- Código Civil Napoleónico: Requiere reformas legislativas masivas cada generación para adaptarse a cambios tecnológicos/sociales (internet, cripto, biotech).
3. Protección de derechos:
- Habeas Corpus: Emergió de precedentes Common Law (siglo XIII) y protegió libertad durante 700 años.
- Bill of Rights constitucional: Papel mojado desde Patriot Act (2001), NSA surveillance (2013), COVID lockdowns (2020-2021).
Conclusión: No es que critarquías "podrían" ser superiores. Son demostrablemente superiores en coherencia, adaptabilidad y protección de libertades—medido por siglos de datos.
III. Por Qué los Libertarios Son Tímidos: Diagnóstico del Problema
A. Captura intelectual por academia estatista
Educación legal moderna:
- 100% de facultades de derecho enseñan que "derecho = legislación + constitución + jurisprudencia estatal".
- 0% enseñan historia de Common Law competitivo, Lex Mercatoria, o Brehon Law como sistemas alternativos funcionales.
Resultado: Incluso libertarios educados en esas instituciones internalizan marco estatista. Asumen que "derecho sin legislador central" es radical/utópico, cuando históricamente fue la norma durante milenios.
B. Miedo a ser etiquetados "extremistas"
Psicología del debate público:
- Decir "necesitamos reformar impuestos" = respetable.
- Decir "necesitamos eliminar legisladores y volver a jueces competitivos" = etiquetado "anarquista utópico".
Pero:
- Proponer socialismo tras 100M de muertos = respetable en academia.
- Proponer critarquía tras 1,000 años de éxito en Irlanda = "extremista".
Conclusión: Los libertarios son prisioneros del marco overton definido por estatistas. Ceden terreno retórico innecesariamente.
C. Confusión entre "políticamente viable" e "intelectualmente correcto"
Dos preguntas distintas:
- ¿Es critarquía superior a legislocracia? (Pregunta empírica/filosófica)
- ¿Podemos implementar critarquía en democracia de masas contemporánea? (Pregunta estratégica/política)
Error libertario: Confundir respuestas. Porque (2) es difícil, dudan en afirmar (1) con contundencia.
Comparación con socialistas:
- Socialistas afirman "socialismo es superior" con cero evidencia.
- Libertarios dudan en afirmar "critarquía es superior" con siglos de evidencia.
Resultado: Socialistas ganan debate narrativo; libertarios pierden pese a tener datos (la realidad a su favor).
IV. Por Qué DEBEMOS (No "Podríamos") Volver a Sistemas de Jueces
A. El imperativo epistémico: Seguir la evidencia donde conduce
Método científico aplicado a instituciones:
- Observar datos históricos (Common Law, Lex Mercatoria, Brehon Law funcionaron siglos).
- Comparar con alternativas (sistemas legislativos modernos colapsan en coherencia tras 100-200 años).
- Concluir basándose en evidencia, no en preferencias políticas.
Conclusión ineludible: Competencia judicial > monopolio legislativo (medido por durabilidad, coherencia, adaptabilidad, protección de derechos).
Imperativo: Si somos honestos intelectualmente, DEBEMOS defender restauración de critarquías, no especular tímidamente sobre si "podrían funcionar".
B. El imperativo moral: Defender lo que sabemos que funciona
Argumento ético:
- Sistemas legislativos modernos causan daño masivo demostrable: Leyes contradictorias destruyen vidas (empresarios encarcelados por violar regulaciones que no podían conocer; familias destruidas por códigos familiares kafkianos).
- Sabemos que alternativa superior existe y funcionó durante siglos.
- Defender status quo legislativo en lugar de critarquía probada = complicidad moral con daño evitable.
Comparación:
- Si supiéramos que medicina alternativa cura cáncer (con evidencia de 1,000 años), pero medicina oficial mata pacientes (con evidencia de 100 años), tendríamos obligación moral de defender la alternativa, no especular tímidamente.
- Situación es análoga con derecho: la critarquía curó conflictos durante milenios; legislocracia los envenena con contradicciones masivas, atropellos e injusticias.
V. Cómo Formular el Argumento con Contundencia
Formulación INCORRECTA (timidez libertaria típica):
"Teóricamente, un sistema de tribunales privados competitivos podría generar mejor derecho que legisladores monopolísticos. Hay algunos casos históricos que sugieren que esto podría ser viable. Quizás valdría la pena experimentar con esto en el futuro."
Problemas:
- Lenguaje condicional ("podría", "quizás").
- Minimiza evidencia ("algunos casos").
- Suena especulativo, no basado en datos.
Formulación CORRECTA (basada en evidencia):
"Los sistemas de jueces competitivos funcionaron exitosamente durante siglos o milenios en múltiples civilizaciones: Common Law inglés (800 años), Lex Mercatoria (500 años), Irlanda céltica (1,000 años), Islandia libre (332 años), Roma republicana (482 años). Estos sistemas generaron derecho coherente, adaptable y protector de libertades sin legisladores centrales. En contraste, sistemas legislativos modernos colapsan en maraña regulatoria contradictoria tras 100-200 años (EE.UU.: 185,000 páginas de regulaciones federales; UE: 170,000 páginas de acquis). La evidencia histórica es concluyente: competencia judicial es superior a monopolio legislativo. Por tanto, DEBEMOS restaurar critarquías —gobierno de jueces competitivos— y abandonar legislocracias fallidas. No es especulación utópica; es aplicar método científico a instituciones: seguir la evidencia donde conduce."
Ventajas:
- Lenguaje declarativo ("funcionaron", "generaron", "es superior", "DEBEMOS").
- Cita evidencia específica y cuantificada.
- Invierte carga de la prueba: estatistas deben explicar por qué preferir sistemas que fallan en 200 años sobre sistemas que funcionaron 1,000 años.
VI. Conclusión: De la Timidez a la Contundencia Basada en Evidencia
Diagnóstico final:
Los libertarios son tímidos ante evidencia histórica abrumadora de superioridad de critarquías por tres razones:
- Captura intelectual por academia estatista que nunca enseña estos casos.
- Miedo a etiqueta de "extremistas" en marco overton controlado por estatistas.
- Confusión entre viabilidad política inmediata y corrección intelectual.
Pero esta timidez es:
- Intelectualmente injustificable: Tenemos 2,500 años de evidencia de que la competencia judicial funciona.
- Moralmente problemática: Conocemos la alternativa superior que reduciría el daño masivo que trae la maraña legislativa.
- Estratégicamente destructiva: Cedemos terreno narrativo a socialistas que controlan el debate con cero evidencia.
La posición correcta:
"DEBEMOS volver a sistemas de jueces competitivos y abandonar la legislación monopolística."
No porque sea políticamente viable mañana. Sino porque:
- Es verdad empírica (funcionó durante siglos, demostrable).
- Es superior mediblemente (coherencia, adaptabilidad, protección de libertades).
- Es deber intelectual seguir la evidencia hasta donde conduzca.
- Es estrategia necesaria para mover la Ventana de Overton y hacer viable lo que hoy parece imposible.
Los socialistas lograron que "abolir el capitalismo" siga siendo respetable tras un siglo de fracasos. Los libertarios pueden lograr que "abolir legislaturas (políticos escribiendo la ley) y restaurar critarquías" suene respetable con siglos de éxitos en su favor—pero solo si abandonan la timidez y defienden la evidencia con la contundencia que merece.
El Common Law funcionó 800 años (hasta que los países anglosajones se afrancesaron). La Lex Mercatoria 500 años. La Brehon Law 1,000 años. Eso no es especulación. Es Historia. Y la Historia nos dice: la competencia judicial produce mejor -menos contradictorio e injusto- y más objetivo Derecho que cualquier monopolio legislativo.
The Impossibility of Legal Calculation in Legal Socialism: Why Competition Produces More Objective Law Than State Monopolies
The Impossibility of Legal Calculation in Legal Socialism: Why Competition Produces More Objective Law Than State Monopolies
Introduction: The Blind Spot of Legal "Simple Minds"
Defenders of the self-restraining-minimal-state fantasy cling to the belief that the production of law and security is magically exempt from economic laws and principles.
They argue that "objective law" requires great legislators writing constitutions, state judicial monopolies, and centralized written codes.
But here's the inconvenient truth: the production of law and security is not exempt from economic laws and principles.
Just as central planning fails in the economy, it fails in the legal realm. Without market prices and competition, legislators cannot rationally calculate the costs and benefits of laws, leading to regulatory tangles, contradictions, and capture by interest groups.
But there's another layer to this problem: we live in an era without great men or classical liberal elites. Contemporary legislators are not the enlightened philosophers of the 18th century; they are mediocre politicians captured by special interests.
The solution is not to wait for "better legislators" (who do not exist) but to restore judicial competition: allow multiple courts to compete for clients, generating precedents through the resolution of concrete cases, with law emerging from the bottom up—critarchy, not legislocracy.
Section I: Mises' Argument: The Impossibility of Socialist Economic Calculation
A. The Original Thesis (1920)
In Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (1920), Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that central economic planning is rationally impossible without market prices.
The argument:
- Market prices aggregate dispersed information about preferences, resources, and technology.
- In socialism (state ownership of the means of production), there are no markets for capital goods.
- Without prices, planners cannot calculate opportunity costs, relative efficiency, or optimal allocation.
- Result: Overproduction of unnecessary goods, shortages of critical goods, massive waste of resources.
Historical Evidence:
- The USSR produced millions of useless tractors while food was scarce.
- Venezuela produces oil but imports refined gasoline.
Without price signals, allocation collapses.
B. The Legal Analogy: Legal Socialism
State legal monopoly = Judicial socialism:
- Legislators monopolize the production of norms (like central planners monopolize economic production).
- No prices and costs of law enforcement and for rules (competition among courts that reveal which rules are efficient).
- Result: Accumulation of contradictory laws, regulatory obsolescence, collapse in coherence—the impossibility of rational legal calculation.
But above all, law never tends towards objective because as the Public Choice School demonstrated (J. Buchanan, Nobel Prize and G. Tullock), politician-made legislation always favors interests groups, pressure groups and lobbies. There is no such a thing as politician or State-made "objective" law, unless one decides to ignore the last 3.500 years of economic history and political and war history.
At this point in human histori, being naive about concepts like "the constitution limits the government in size and scope" (when evidently it didn't and it doesn't) is no virtue.
Contemporary Examples:
| Example | Description |
|---|---|
| U.S. Federal Code | 54 titles, ~60,000 pages, nobody can read it completely (not even judges or lawyers). |
| European Regulation | ~170,000 pages of accumulated regulations (European Commission, 2024). |
| Argentina | Civil, Commercial, Penal Codes, plus special laws = +100,000 current norms (conservative estimate, Infoleg, 2024). |
Misesian Question: If no human being can know all current law, how can there be "rational application" of the law? It is analogous to a central planner who cannot know all preferences and resources in the economy.
Friedrich Hayek's work on the use of knowledge in society reinforces this point. Hayek argued that the knowledge required for effective central planning is dispersed among individuals and cannot be centralized. Similarly, the knowledge required for effective legal planning is dispersed among judges, lawyers, and citizens, and cannot be centralized in a legislative body.
Section II: The Production of Law and Security is Not Exempt from Economic Laws
A. The Economic Nature of Law and Security
Law and security are not ethereal concepts; they are goods and services subject to economic principles.
Economic Principles:
- Scarcity: Resources (time, expertise, enforcement capacity) are limited.
- Cost: Producing laws and security has opportunity costs.
- Supply and Demand: The need for legal services and security varies.
- Incentives: Producers respond to incentives (reputation, profit, power).
Implication: Just as markets allocate goods and services efficiently, markets can allocate law and security efficiently.
B. The Market for Law and Security
Market Mechanism:
- Competition: Multiple providers compete for clients.
- Prices: Fees for legal services reflect supply and demand.
- Innovation: Providers innovate to attract clients.
- Quality Control: Reputation and client feedback ensure quality.
Historical Examples:
| Example | Description |
|---|---|
| Medieval Lex Mercatoria | Private arbitral tribunals at trade fairs (Champagne, Bruges, Lübeck). Judges chosen by merchants, without state coercive power. |
| Celtic Ireland | Private judges (brehons) competed for reputation, without state coercive power. |
| Free Iceland | Individuals chose which goði (judge-leader) to follow, could change annually. |
Lesson: Competition generates efficient, adaptable, and high-quality law and security.
Section III: The Lack of Good Elites Finishes the Case Against Legal Simpletonism
A. The 18th Century vs. Today
18th Century:
- Enlightened philosophers (Locke, Montesquieu, Smith).
- Classical liberal elites committed to liberty and rule of law.
- Limited government and respect for property rights.
Today:
- Mediocre politicians captured by special interests.
- Regulatory capture and rent-seeking.
- Expansive government and erosion of property rights.
Implication: The lack of good elites makes centralized legal systems central-design (vertical design) even more problematic.
B. The Blindness to Historical Facts
Historical Facts:
- Common Law: 800 years of coherence without a central legislator.
- Lex Mercatoria: 500 years of consistent rules without a state.
- Celtic Ireland: 1,000 years of shared written codes without a monopolistic legislator.
Blindness: Legal "simple minds" ignore these historical facts, clinging to the belief that centralized systems are superior.
Reality: Decentralized systems have produced efficient, adaptable, and just law and security.
Section IV: Response to Randian (and Similar) Objections
Objection 1: "Without a central legislator, each judge would apply their own 'subjective' law, causing chaos"
Historical Refutation:
- Common Law: 800 years of coherence without a central legislator until Westminster (19th century).
- Lex Mercatoria: 500 years of consistent rules without a state.
- Celtic Ireland: A thousand years of shared written codes (Senchus Mór) without a monopolistic legislator.
Mechanism: Competition generates convergence towards efficient norms. Judges who rule arbitrarily lose clients. Successful precedents spread through imitation (like successful business innovations spread in markets).
Economic Analogy: No one says "without a central planner, each entrepreneur would produce incompatible goods, causing chaos." We know that competition generates de facto standards (e.g., USB format, TCP/IP protocol) without a central designer.
Objection 2: "We Need Written Constitutions to Protect Fundamental Rights"
Empirical Refutation:
| Example | Description |
|---|---|
| U.S. Constitution (1787) | Limits federal government to enumerated powers. Current result: Federal government regulates everything (from toilet sizes to health insurance content). Constitution ignored through expansively interpreted "commerce clause." |
| Weimar Constitution (Germany, 1919) | Declared extensive rights. Result: Hitler came to power legally and suspended everything (1933). |
Comparison with Common Law:
- Magna Carta (1215): Was not a "constitution" but a contract between the king and nobles limiting taxes. It worked because it was backed by decentralized force (barons could rebel).
- Habeas Corpus: Emerged from judicial precedents (13th century), not legislation. It protected freedom for centuries because competitive judges applied it case by case.
Lesson: Written constitutions are worthless paper without decentralized enforcement. Judicial competition generates enforcement because judges depend on reputation.
Objection 3: We Live in an Era Without Great Men; Yet We Need Institutions Designed by Enlightened Elites
Response: That's exactly why we need competition, not monopoly.
If there are no great legislators:
- Legislative monopoly = bad legislators without competition = inevitable legal socialism and privilege and injustice.
- Judicial competition = bad judges lose clients, good judges prosper = institutional Darwinism.
Economic Analogy: We don't need "great entrepreneurs" to have good products. We need competition that selects efficient companies and eliminates inefficient ones.
Rand made a philosophical mistake: She assumed that "objective law" requires rationalist epistemology (great minds designing perfect codes). But history shows that objective law emerges from evolutionary processes (judicial competition generating precedents), not centralized design.
Conclusion: Restoring Norm Markets
Central Thesis:
The state monopoly on legal production faces the same problem that Mises identified for the socialist economy: the impossibility of rational calculation without market signals. Without competition among courts, there is no mechanism to discover which norms are efficient, fair, and adaptable. The observable result is legal socialism: the accumulation of contradictory laws (+185,000 pages in the U.S., +170,000 in the EU), regulatory obsolescence, capture by lobbies, and the impossibility of rational compliance.
The solution is not to wait for "better legislators" (who do not exist in contemporary mass democracies) or "better constitutions" (which are worthless paper without decentralized enforcement). The solution is to restore judicial competition: allow multiple courts to compete for clients, generating precedents through the resolution of concrete cases, with law emerging from the bottom up—critarchy, not legislocracy.
Historical Evidence:
The five most successful legal systems in the West—Common Law, Lex Mercatoria, Brehon Law, Icelandic Alþingi, Republican Roman Law—operated through decentralized judicial competition, not legislative monopolies. They lasted for centuries (Common Law 800 years, Lex Mercatoria 500 years, Ireland 1,000 years) generating coherence, adaptability, and protection of rights without the need for "great legislators."
When Rome, England, and other systems centralized legal production (Roman Empire, Westminster Parliament), legal quality collapsed: rigidity, contradictions, capture by concentrated interests—exactly what Mises predicted for socialized economies.
Implication for Randians and Defenders of the Minimal State:
If they accept Mises' argument against economic socialism, they must accept its application to law. They cannot defend the state judicial monopoly while attacking the state economic monopoly—it is philosophical inconsistency.
The "objective law" they seek will not come from constitutions written by mediocre politicians in mass democracies. It will come from restoring norm markets: competition among private arbitral tribunals (already existing in international commercial arbitration), expansion of special jurisdictions (economic zones, charter cities), and eventual transition to full critarchy—government by competitive judges, not monopolistic legislators.
History has already conducted the experiment. The data is conclusive. Judicial competition produces better objective law than legislative monopolies. Ignoring this evidence due to dogmatic attachment to the "need for a minimal state with judicial monopoly" is to commit the same error as socialists: subordinating empirical reality to preconceived theory.
It is time to apply liberty ideas consistently: if competition works in the economy, it works in law. The impossibility of socialist legal calculation is as real as the impossibility of socialist economic calculation. And the solution is the same: markets, not monopolies.
Juan Fernando Carpio, M.E.E.
Further Readings
For those interested in delving deeper into the themes discussed in this article, the following readings are recommended:
Works by Stephan Kinsella (a continuator of the Mises-Rothbard-Hoppe line of ideas)
-
"Law Without the State" - This article explores the possibility of a legal system without a central state authority, arguing that law can emerge spontaneously from the interactions of individuals.
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"Legislation and Law in a Free Society" - Kinsella discusses the nature of law and legislation in a free society, critiquing the idea that law must be produced by a central authority.
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"What Libertarianism Is" - This article provides an overview of libertarian principles, including the idea that law and security can be provided by the market rather than the state.
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"Against Intellectual Property" - While not directly about legal systems, this work by Kinsella critiques state-enforced intellectual property laws and argues for a market-based approach to innovation and creativity.
Additional Readings
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"Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth" by Ludwig von Mises - The seminal work that argues central economic planning is impossible without market prices.
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"The Use of Knowledge in Society" by Friedrich Hayek - This article discusses the limitations of central planning and the importance of dispersed knowledge in a market economy.
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"The Law and the State" by Bruno Leoni - Leoni argues that law is not the product of legislative enactment but the result of individual interactions and the gradual development of customs and traditions.
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"The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State" by Bruce L. Benson - This book provides historical examples of how law can be produced and enforced without a central state authority.
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"Law, Legislation, and Liberty" by Friedrich Hayek - A three-volume work that explores the principles of a free society, including the role of law and the limitations of legislation.
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"The Market for Liberty" by Morris and Linda Tannehill - This book discusses how a free market can provide law and security without a state.
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"The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism" by David Friedman - This book explores how a stateless society could function, including the provision of law and security.
These readings provide a deeper understanding of the economic principles governing the production of law and security, the historical examples of decentralized legal systems, and the critique of centralized legal systems.
Summary of the Debate: Philipp Bagus (pro-Milei) vs. Alessandro Fusillo (critical)
Summary of the Debate: Philipp Bagus (pro-Milei) vs. Alessandro Fusillo (critical) The debate revolves around one central question: Is Jav...
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The initial article can be found here: https://paulvillegas.substack.com/p/a-refutation-of-rothbardian-and-hoppean Rebuttal to "A Ref...
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The Impossibility of Legal Calculation in Legal Socialism: Why Competition Produces More Objective Law Than State Monopolies Introduction...


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